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London's underground





#### European power grid



#### The Internet

UdG <u>http://visualign.wordpress.com/2012/07/11/london-tube-map-and-graph-visualizations/</u> www.geni.org www.cheswick.com



# Network Robustness Simulator

#### Multiple failures

- Single vs multiple
- Correlated
- Dynamic scenarios ("attacks")
- Robustness metric
- Results visualization





Because multiple failures happen rarely... - there is less incentive to tackle them - but that is changing: **their consequences are too costly** 





**Large-scale failure**: a multiple failure in which a significant portion of network elements are affected by failures, all related to a single cause.



# Network Robustness Simulator

- Multiple failures
- Dynamic scenarios ("attacks")
- Robustness metric
- Results visualization







- **Static** scenarios are simulated as one-off attacks or failures. However...
  - **Dynamic** failures are more complicated because:
    - They occur along a **period** of time
  - There is a *cause* that triggers the *propagation*
  - On top of random, there are other **interesting cases:** 
    - Targeted
    - Epidemics
    - Cascading





They are normally provoked by malicious attacks (human driven)

There is a strategy to maximize the impact

Most important nodes/links are attacked first:

- Hubs (i.e. elements with the highest nodal degree, betweeness, etc.
- Central links (based on betweeness)







A failure that propagates in the network can be modelled using an **epidemic** model.







## Dynamic scenarios: cascading

A failure that propagates in the network can be modelled using an **cascading** model.





# Network Robustness Simulator

- Multiple failures
- Dynamic scenarios ("attacks")
- Robustness metric
  - Structural
  - Centrality
  - Functional
- Results visualization









Robustness (robustus / robur), means "oak" in Latin, being the symbol of strength and longevity in the ancient world.

"Robustness is the ability of a network to continue performing well even when it is subject to failures or attacks."





#### Structural

(based on classic graph properties)

- Average nodal degree, Finding paths
- Connectivity & fragmentation
- Centrality

(it locates the most "important" nodes/links)

 Degree, Betweenness, Spectral propierties, Eigenvector, ...

#### Dynamic/Functional

(based on the expected performance of existing **services** on the network)

• Throughput, Link occupancy, ...



# Unconnected graphs metric relaxation

After removing some elements, the graph could easily become disconnected and some metrics are useless as they are just defined for connected networks.

The shortest path between nodes i and j (they are not connected) according the graph theory is  $\infty$ .

• In our approach, it becomes useless.

Relaxation: the weight of a missing link is set to the diameter of the full network.

Paths using missing links are artificially long but not infinite.

As all links are equally treated the comparisons among different networks is therefore fair.







## "Can we get an unified value of robustness considering "all" metrics?"





Trajanovski et. al have proposed a framework to evaluate the robustness of complex networks, which is based on the generic metric R-value.

The R-value is denoted by:



where **s** and **t** are n × 1 weight and graph metric vectors, respectively

The R-value includes several graph metrics characterizing the network robustness.



Stojan Trajanovski, Javier Martín-Hernández, Wynand Winterbach, and Piet Van Mieghem. Robustness envelopes of networks. Journal of Complex Networks, 2013.



Based on R-value,

 $R = \sum_{k=1}^{n} S_k t_k$ 

for a **dynamic** scenario we proposed the **R\*-value** obtained by extracting the most informative robustness metric from the **n** computed metrics **and normalised** 

Instead of weights (s<sub>k</sub> as for R value) a normalised eigen vector  $\hat{\mathcal{V}}_k$  is used.

$$R_{p,m}^* = \sum_{k=1}^n \hat{v}_k t_k$$

a normalized eigenvector





# Network Robustness Simulator

- Multiple failures
- Dynamic scenarios ("attacks")
- Robustness metric
- Results visualization
  - All numerical results (in a XML file)
  - Robustness surfaces
  - Interactive "attack" visualization



Robustness Surfaces:

p & m parameters to compute the R\* value

 In the example a P % network is "stressesed" by removing P elements

BCDS

- removing **P** elements
  - P varies 0% to 40%
  - P rows are obtained.
- For a given P, M independent experiments are performed.
  - M varies 1 to 50
  - M columns are obtanined.





## Robustness Surfaces:

### p & m parameters to compute the R\* value

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0.9



"Robustness surfaces of complex networks", Manzano, M., Sahneh, F., Scoglio, C., Calle, E., & Marzo, J. L. Scientific Reports, Nature. September 2014 20



# Robustness Surfaces. $\Omega$ matrix

 $\boldsymbol{\Omega}$  is a matrix where:

the rows are the percentage of failures (p) and

the columns are the failure configurations (m) for a giving p













grid10Nodes





scalefree100grau3



BCDS

tree100Nodes





## video





## Conclusions

- A complet set of A<sub>p</sub> matrixes are obtained by extending the calculation to different percentage of failures and failure configurations.
- Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to extract the most significant information of a set of robustness metrics which is used to normalise R-value (obtaining R\*-values)
- Drawing the robustness surface, a novel framework is provided to visually assess the network robustness variability





#### Future work

- To allow automatic comparison between surfaces (on top of visual inspection)
- Backtracking to identify particular failure scenarios with sharp transicions in the surface image
- Increasing the performance of the calculations
  - Most of the calculations can be simultaneously computed
- Adding network interdependences





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